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Public Officials' Facebook "Likes":
The Case for Leaving Regulation of
Official "Likes" to the Torches
and Pitchforks of Constituents
Haleigh Jones*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As of 2014, there were more than one billion active Facebook users.'
This means that seventy-one percent of adults with Internet access are on
Facebook.2 These statistics lead to an undeniable conclusion: "social media"3
has impacted communication and idea sharing. This is, in large part, because
social media makes expressing approval or disproval of a particular statement easier than ever. On Facebook, for example, expressing approval is as
easy as clicking the "like" button.4
While social media users generally understand "liking" a post to indicate approval, the legal significance of a Facebook "like" remains unclear.
This confusion stems largely from the fact that social media use has been no
exception to the truism that the law responds slowly to technological
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I.

About Facebook - Milestones, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
facebook/info?tab=milestone (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).

2.

Maeve Duggan, et al., Demographicsof Key Social Networking Platforms, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.pewintemet.org/2015/01/09/
demographics-of-key-social-networking-platforms-2.

3.

Starting with a definition of "social media" is helpful. The dictionary defines it
as "forms of electronic communications (as websites for social networking and
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)." Social Media
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
social%20media# (last visited Nov. 13, 2015); see also Lane v. Facebook, Inc.,
696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012) (Facebook is an "online social network
where members develop personalized web profiles to interact and share information with other members.").

4.

See Mattocks v. Black Entm't. Telev. LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1315 (S.D.
Fla. 2014) ("Facebook users can 'like' a Facebook Page ... or specific postings
on a Page, by clicking a 'like' button supplied by Facebook.").
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change.5 The extent to which public officials are subject to special rules governing their conduct on social media begs for clarity. Others have addressed
this question generally, focusing on whether officials may maintain any social media presence at all.6 This article will look at this question more narrowly and will analyze whether it is appropriate for public officials to "like"
Facebook content in an official capacity.
This article will first consider the arguments for creating special rules
that would explicitly restrict a public official's ability to "like" Facebook
content. Most importantly, recent studies and developments in litigation reflect that a Facebook "like" has both political and commercial significance.
On this basis, a "like" can be considered a significant form of self-expression, the type of which has always been regulated in the context of what
public employees can and cannot say.
The second half of this article will consider arguments against creating
special rules to govern Facebook "likes." That portion of this article will
consider the practical difficulties with capturing a Facebook "like" as part of
the public record. This article will also discuss the degree of difficulty associated with distinguishing between public and private Facebook content. Finally, this article will conclude that socio-cultural normative understandings
of how Facebook users interact are sufficient to govern official conduct on
Facebook.
II.

THE IMPACT OF A FACEBOOK "LIKE" AND THE CASE
FOR REGULATION

Before turning to the impact of a "like," it is important to understand
exactly what a "like" is. "The 'like' button is represented on Facebook by a
thumbs-up icon, and the word 'like' appears next to different types of
Facebook content."7 Users "like" content by clicking the thumbs-up icon.8
The Southern District Court of Florida in Mattocks v. Black Entertainment

5.

See Christina Skinner, The Unprofessional Sides of Social Media and Social
Networking: How Current Standards Fall Short, 63 S.C. L. REv. 241, 242

(2011) ("[T]he practice of law seems at odds with this information-sharing
revolution."); but see JOHN BROWNING, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL
NETWORKING: UNDERSTANDING

SOCIAL MEDIA'S IMPACT ON THE LAw

154

(2010) ("Law is never going to keep pace with technology. Adopt a specialized
rule now addressing a particular medium, and both the medium and the rule
will be obsolete before you know it.").
6.

See generally Jan L. Jacobowitz, Lawyers Beware: You Are What You PostThe Case for Integrating Cultural Competence, Legal Ethics, and Social Media, 17 SMU Sci. & TECH. L.R. 541 (2014); see also John Browning, Symposium, Social Media and the Law: Why Can't We Be Friends?, 68 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 487, 488 (2014); see also Skinner, supra note 5.

7.

Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013).

8.

See id.
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Television LLC defined "liking" something on Facebook as "an easy way to
let someone know that you enjoy it."9 This is consistent with a common
cultural understanding of the significance of liking Facebook content.
But Facebook "likes" can carry other meaning as well. Facebook's own
definition of "liking" is even more consistent with the cultural understandings surrounding the function. Facebook defines "liking" as a way for
Facebook users to share information with each other.o This definition reflects the idea that "likes" are not merely used to convey happiness or enjoyment; instead, "likes" can also be used to acknowledge ideas or feelings
resulting from negative events. For example, it would be perfectly appropriate for me to "like" a statement by my friend on Facebook if she posted,
"Today, my puppy dug a hole under my fence in the back yard, ate all of my
neighbor's petunias, and then escaped. If any of my neighbors that I am
friends with find him, please call me at the number below." In this case, by
"liking" my friend's post, I am not expressing enjoyment over the fact that
her new puppy has escaped and demolished her neighbor's flower beds. Instead, other Facebook users who noted that I had "liked" the post would
understand that I was merely acknowledging my friend's feelings of angst
over her missing puppy and expressing empathy.
Obviously, this connotation of a Facebook "like" conflicts some with
our literal dictionary understanding of what it means to like something."
Because a Facebook "like" does convey expressive connotation that, oftentimes, goes beyond enjoyment of an idea, "likes" have meaning. They are
valuable in both political and commercial settings.
A.

Facebook "Likes" as Political Speech

Several courts have now considered the political importance of a
Facebook "like." At least one court has found a "like" to constitute political
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. In Bland v. Roberts, Sheriff
B.J. Roberts sought reelection as sheriff.12 At that time, Roberts had served
as sheriff for seventeen years.1 3 Jim Adams announced in early 2009 that he
would run against Sheriff Roberts.14 During the campaign, Jim Adams cre-

9.

Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1315 (citing What does it mean to "Like" something?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/452446998120360 (last
visited Nov. 13, 2015)).

10.

See What does it mean to "Like" something?, FACEBOOK, https://
www'facebook.com/help/452446998120360 (last visited Nov. 13, 2015); see
also Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012).

11.

Like Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
aryllike (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (defining "like" as "to enjoy (something)").

12.

Bland, 730 F.3d at 372.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.
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ated an official campaign Facebook page. 15 Daniel Ray Carter, one of Sheriff
Roberts's employees, "liked" Jim Adams's campaign page.1 6 Roberts ultimately won the election and fired all of his employees who had openly supported Jim Adams-including Carter.'1
Carter, joined by other employees, filed a Section 1983 claim against
Roberts, alleging that "Roberts retaliated against the plaintiffs in violation of
their First Amendment rights by choosing not to reappoint them because of
their support of his electoral opponent."8 Roberts relied on Carter's
Facebook "like" of Jim Adams's page as evidence that Carter had supported
Roberts's opponent in the election.19 As a result, an issue arose as to whether
a Facebook "like" is protectable expression for purposes of the First
Amendment.20
According to the Fourth Circuit, it is. The court stated:
Once one understands the nature of what Carter did by liking the
Campaign Page, it becomes apparent that hisconduct qualifies as
speech. On the most basic level, clicking on the "like" button literally causes to be published the statement that the User "likes"
something, which is itself a substantive statement. In the context
of a political campaign's Facebook page, the meaning that the
user approves of the candidacy whose page is being liked is unmistakable. That a user may use a single mouse click to produce
that message that he likes the page instead of typing the same
message with several individual keystrokes is of no constitutional
significance.21
As a result, the trial court's decision granting Sheriff Roberts's Motion for
Summary Judgment was reversed on appeal, and the case was remanded for
trial.22 This case is the most direct judicial recognition of the fact that a
Facebook "like" is sufficiently expressive to be protectable political speech.
B.

The Commercial Value of Facebook "Likes"

Facebook "likes" create the potential for people and pages to connect,
which makes collecting Facebook "likes" commercially valuable. Increas15.

See id. at 380.

16.

Id. at 384.

17.

Id. at 372-73.

18.

Bland, 730 F.3d at 372-73.

19.

Id. at 380.

20.

See generally id.

21.

Id. at 386.

22.

Id. at 394.
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ingly, companies rely on Facebook as a marketing tool.23 To understand this
trend, it is necessary to have at least a preliminary understanding of how
Facebook generates search results.
In 2013, the founders of Facebook implemented its current search engine, known as "Graph Search."24 Graph Search is a semantic search engine
designed to find search results using natural language search terms.25 Search
box entries are "autocompleted," which means that as the searcher enters
search terms, Facebook recommends connections to other people and
pages. 26 As a result, it became more significant for a Facebook user to "like"
a page, because Graph Search will generate that "like" as a connection in
response to certain types of searches. 27 For example, a law student at SMU
could search for "friends who 'like' SMU Law School" and a list of that
student's friends who had "liked" the school's Facebook page would appear.
Thus, each "like" on Facebook creates a potential for a connection to another
person or page.
While a "like" may seem like a small thing, the potential for connection
created by a Facebook "like" is commercially valuable, and, as a result, analysts are starting to measure the value of a single Facebook "like."28 Of
course, the researchers note that "[t]he numbers [vary] wildly . . . depending
on the variables [used] to calculate the value."29 According to Blackbaud,
NTEN, and Common Knowledge, in their 2012 Nonprofit Social Networking
Benchmark Report, "the average value of a like for non-profits seeking to
attract donations, calculated based off total revenue received from a supporter over the twelve months following acquisition [is] $214.81."3o Analysts
from Syncapse, an enterprise social media marketing management company,
concluded that with regard to for-profit companies, "a Facebook fan is worth
[on average] $136.38 more than a customer who is a nonfan."31 And according to Vitrue, another social media marketing management firm, a fan base

23.

See Jim Edwards, What is a Facebook "Like" Actually Worth in Dollars?,
BUSINESS

INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.businessinsider.

com/what-is-a-facebook-like-actually-worth-in-dollars-2013-3.
24.

Francis Bea, Hands on: Facebook Graph Search Digs Deep, Even if it Doesn't
Always Strike Gold, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.digital-

trends.com/social-media/hands-on-with-facebook-graph-search.
25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

See Edwards, supra note 23.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id. (explaining that Syncapse "quantified fans' and nonfans' product spending,
loyalty to a company, propensity to recommend a company, brand affinity,
media value, and acquisition cost" to determine this figure).
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of one million Facebook supporters "translates into at least $3.6 million in
equivalent media over a year."32
This data leads to two conclusions regarding the commercial value of a
"like." First, the number of Facebook "likes" that a company has can indicate
commercial success. Second, not only do "likes" indicate commercial success, but they can also result in revenue by attracting customers, investors,
and higher quality employees and by allowing people to make connections
based on their support of a company. These concepts are related.
At least one case exists in which parties litigated the rights to Facebook
"likes."33 From 2006 to 2009, the CW Network broadcasted a television
drama entitled "The Game," "a dramatic comedy about the lives of professional football players and their wives and girlfriends."34 When Black Entertainment Television (BET) discovered a popular fan page for the show on
Facebook, created by Stacey Mattocks, BET hired Mattocks to manage an
official Facebook fan page on a part-time basis.35 Eventually, Mattocks and
BET began discussing the possibility of employing Mattocks full-time.36
During the course of these discussions, Mattocks informed BET that she
would "restrict BET's administrative access" to the Facebook Page "[u]ntil
such time as [they could] reach an amicable and mutually beneficial resolution" regarding her employment.37
Mattocks limited BET's administrative access to the page the same
day. 3 8 In response, BET asked Facebook to "migrate" the "likes" on Mattocks's page over to a new Facebook page controlled by BET.39 After review
of Mattocks's page, Facebook granted BET's request and moved the "likes"
associated with the Facebook page to the BET-sponsored page.40 Mattocks
claimed that doing so converted a business interest (the "likes" the page had
accumulated while she ran it) she had in the Facebook page. 4 1 Mattocks asserted that the "substantial interest in the [Facebook page] and the significant
number of '[1]ikes' generated by Mattocks provided her with business opportunities[,]" because companies pay her for redirecting visitors to their sites.42

32.

Id.

33.

See generally Mattocks v. Black Entm't. Telev. LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311,

34.

Id. at 1314.

35.

Id. at 1315-16.

36.

Id. at 1316.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1316.

40.

Id. at 1317.

41.

Id. at 1321.

42.

Id. at 1320.

1315 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
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The court held that Mattocks could not establish that she owned a property interest in the "likes" on the Facebook page. 43 The court explained that
"'liking' a [Facebook page] simply means that the user is expressing his or
her enjoyment or approval of the content. At any time . . . the user is free to
revoke the 'like' by clicking an 'unlike' button."44 The court concluded that
"if anyone can be deemed to own the 'likes' on a [p]age, it is the individual
users responsible for them."45
This case illustrates the commercial value of a "like." The conclusion
from the holdings of Bland and Mattingly is clear: Facebook "likes" are a
form of expression with legal and commercial significance. As a result, public officials might consider themselves restricted in their ability to freely
"like" pages on Facebook in an official capacity. Therefore, Facebook
"likes" should not be considered an exception to those rules that limit public
officials in what they can and cannot say online.
C.

Traditional Restrictions on Government Officials' Ability to
Speak Publicly

The government can regulate the speech of civilians in narrowly defined
circumstances only.46 Generally, regulation of civilian speech is permissible
when exceptions or exclusions to the First Amendment apply.47 In contrast,
the government has much greater latitude to restrict the speech of its employees. 4 8 Even so, the First Amendment prohibits regulation of a public employee's speech when the speech addresses a matter of public concern.49
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that analysis of whether the restriction
of a public employee's ability to speak on a matter of public concern violates
the First Amendment requires "a balance between the interests of the [em-

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 1320-21.

45.

Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1321.

46.

See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.

47.

Certain categories of speech lack the full extent of constitutional protection.
Traditional examples include defamation, fighting words, obscenity, and true
threats. See R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992).

48.

See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that "the government as employer .

49.

.

. has far broader powers than does

the government as sovereign."); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (holding that "the State has interests as an employer in regulating the
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general").
Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 ("To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of
public concern, and the employee's interest in expressing herself on this matter
must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.") (internal quotations omitted).
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ployee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees."50 When the speaker seeks results
that "contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of
governmental functions," efficient and effective government operation may
be impeded.51 For the government to restrict an employee's speech, the
speech must be made in a public forum in which viewers, readers, or listeners
have some capacity to perceive the speech.52 As a result, this doctrine was
traditionally applied in the context of print media.53 The same considerations
that warrant regulating official speech in print media-limiting interference
with official government function-may also justify regulation of speech in
social media.
Facebook is now considered a public forum.54 This means that, under
the analysis from Connick and Pickering, the Facebook content of public
officials can be regulated when it does not speak to a matter of public concern. To avoid application of the difficult Connick balancing test, some localities now entirely prohibit public officials from maintaining a social media
presence. 55 In discussing the zeal of some local governments in prohibiting
online activity, Bill Sherman, Commissioner on the City of Seattle Ethics and
Elections Commission, wrote that, "some [jurisdictions] have gone so far as
to bar public officials from social networks for fear of violating campaign
finance, open meeting, freedom of information, and government ethics
laws."56 Perhaps the clearest example of professional regulation of what public employees may and may not say regarding their public duties appears in

50.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (alteration in original) (internal
citations omitted).

51.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).

52.

Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.

53.

See, e.g., id. at 138 (addressing a questionnaire that a public employee distributed to staff members in retaliation for being fired); see also Pickering, 391
U.S. at 563 (involving a letter sent to a newspaper by a former school employee
that was critical of the way in which the board had handled past proposals to
raise new revenue for the schools).

54.

See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 511-12 (Minn. 2012) ("A university does not violate the [First Amendment] rights of a student enrolled in a
professional program when the university imposes sanctions for Facebook
posts that violate academic program rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct standards."); see also Hatch v.
Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 4th 170, 201 (2000) (noting that the internet is a
public forum); see also Johnson v. Ryan, 346 P.3d 789, 794 (2015) (same).

55.

See Bill Sherman, Social Networking and the Law: Your Mayor, Your
"Friend":Public Officials, Social Networking, and the Unmapped New Public
Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 103 (Winter 2011).

56.

Id. at 95.
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the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Code of Conduct-5
There, judges are specifically prohibited from discussing or commenting on
their pending cases in any way, and in any forum.58
In one case, a judge was removed from the bench because of his use of
social media.59 The report of uncontested sanction arose before the Supreme
Court of Arkansas in fall 2014 from a complaint filed concerning comments
made on the Louisiana State University (LSU) fan message board,
"www.tigerdroppings.com."o The comments were made by an author using
the screen name "geauxjudge."61 Arkansas Judge Maggio admitted on March
3, 2014, that he authored these posts. 62 His comments were classified as "racist, sexist, homophobic or inappropriate."63 Even more concerning, a January 17, 2012, post by "geauxjudge" referenced "possible confidential
proceedings involving actress Charlize Theron's adoption of her son, explaining a 'judge friend' of his handled the case."64 It was unclear at the time
whether it was actually Judge Maggio who handled the case. 65 Judge Maggio
was then forced to end his campaign for a seat on the Arkansas Court of
Appeals on May 5, 2014.66
Judge Maggio's case involved actual statements made on social media.
Such statements are certainly distinct from a Facebook "like." But, importantly, judges have also faced criticism for their Facebook "likes." In 2012,
Kansas Judge Jan Satterfield became the subject of a complaint filed with the
Kansas Commission of Judicial Qualifications after she "liked" a Facebook
campaign post of Sheriff Kelly Herzet.67 The campaign post said, "Soooooo.

57.

See

MODEL

CODE

OF

JUDICIAL

CONDUCT

R.

2.10

(2011),

http://

www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model
codeof-judicial conductlmodel code of-judicial conduct canon_2/rule2 10
judicialstatementsonpendingandimpendingcases.html.
58.

Id.

59.

See Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Maggio, 440 S.W.3d 333, 334
(Ark. 2014).

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

Emily Lane, Arkansas Judge Outed as "geauxjudge" on LSU Fan Message
Board, Ends Bid for Office, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 07, 2014, 12:49 PM),
http://www.nola.com/news/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2014/03/arkansasjudge
outedas-geauxj.html.

64.

Id.

65.

See id.

66.

See id.

67.

See Associated Press, Kansas Judge Causes Stir with Facebook 'like', REAL
CLEAR PoLITICs (July 29, 2012), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/
politics/2012/Jul/29/kansas- udge-causes-stir with facebooklike_.html.
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I was thinking that we could get to 200 likes by 6/18. That's only 88 more.
Wouldn't that be cool?"68 Critics of Judge Satterfield argued that her "like"
of the post "violated the judicial canons of ethics that prohibit a judge from
'publicly endorsing or opposing another candidate for any public office.' "69
Obviously, this case did not specifically delineate what public officials
can and cannot do on social media. It is, however, a good illustration of the
social significance of a "like." A "like" does carry value in the sense that it
has the power to quantify the level of approval for a particular statement,
idea, opinion, or product. With this value in mind, it is easy to understand the
concerns of those who argue that officials should be prohibited from "liking"
social media content: a "like" means something. Because a "like" has such
significance, the argument goes, public officials should not be able to release
"likes" at the click of a button with no potential for consequence. But the
justifications for allowing public officials to "like" content are more
persuasive.
III.

THE CASE FOR ALLOWING PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO
"LIKE" FACEBOOK CONTENT

There are a myriad of reasons not to regulate a public employee's right
to "like" Facebook content. As a preliminary matter, regulating Facebook
"likes" of public employees is impractical. More importantly, the cultural
perspectives surrounding the use of Facebook make such regulation
unnecessary.
A.

Practical Considerations: the Difficulty of Archiving Facebook
"Likes"

Everything a government employee says that relates to official business
is treated as part of the public record.70 And public records must be made
available to a particular agency's constituents.71 As a result, public records
68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

See Sherman, supra note 55, at 108-09 (public records are defined as "any
writing or other record containing information relating to the conduct of government prepared, owned, used, or retained by any part of the government.");
see also Michael Schmidt & Amy Chozick, Using Private Email, Hillary Clinton Thwarted Records Request, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2015, at Al, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/politics/using-private-email-hillary-clintonthwarted-record-requests.html?_r=0 (criticizing Hillary Clinton for using her
private email, rather than her official email as Secretary of State, to avoid producing her emails that are public records.).

71.

For example, in Texas, information is open to the public when it falls within
TEX. Gov'T. CODE § 552.002. That section requires access to "public information .

.

. that is written, produced, collected, assembled, or maintained under a

law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business: (1)
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statutes obligate agencies to archive their employees' public statements. 72
This Big Brother Orwellian feat is difficult enough to accomplish when actual statements are issued.73 This is because social media has become so pervasive in society, and so easy to use, that public officials can release
statements with unprecedented ease at an unprecedented frequency.74 Indeed,
Facebook users generate almost 2.5 billion content shares every single day.75
The sheer volume of these communications makes them hard to track and
archive. If Facebook "likes" of public employees were to be regulated, it
would likely be on the basis of their relevance as political or commercial
expression. And if "likes" are to be regulated on that basis it follows that
they, too, are important enough to be archived as part of the public record.
Presumably, the archival of "likes" would entail a system in which the
date and time that a particular public official "liked" a particular statement
would be recorded. Considering the number of "likes" generated daily,76 as
well as how easy it is to click the "like" button,77 government agencies would
face insurmountable cost and spend significant time recording their employees' "likes."78 Also, consider the chaos that would ensue if public officials

by a governmental body; (2) for a governmental body and the governmental
body .

.

. ; or (3) by an individual officer or employee of a governmental body

in the officer's or employee's official capacity and the information pertains to
official business of the gvernmental body."
72.

Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002) ("Today, all fifty states have
open records statutes, a majority of which are modeled after the [Federal Freedom of Information Act].").

73.

See, e.g., Schmidt & Chozick, supra note 70 (discussing Hillary Clinton's failure to comply with U.S. State Department policies requiring public employees
to use their official emails when sending correspondence in an official capacity). While Clinton's failure was arguably intentional, it still provides an example of the complexities associated with ensuring that all of a public employee's
statements can be satisfactorily preserved and archived as public records.

74.

See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013).

75.

Casey Chan, What Facebook Deals with Everyday, GIZMODo (Aug. 22, 2012,
10:30 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5937143/what-facebook-deals-with-everyday27-billion-likes-300-million-photos-uploaded-and-500-terabytes-of-data.

76.

As of 2012, there were 2.7 billion likes generated daily. Id.

77.

See Bland, 730 F.3d at 385.

78.

Companies are already capitalizing on and privatizing the expense of archiving
social media statements. See Social Media Archiving Built for Government:
Automatic Recapture and Fast Retrieval for Public Records Law Compliance,
ARCHIVESOCIAL,

http://archivesocial.com/social-media-archiving-for-govern

ment (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
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began "unliking" posts.79 If they did so before the original "like" was
archived, perhaps there would be no issue. But currently Facebook gives
users the option to "unlike" a post indefinitely.o It is easy to imagine that
someone reprimanded for a Facebook "like," such as Judge Satterfield in
Kansas,81 would take matters into her own hands-despite the public record-and "unlike" a controversial statement as an act to appease her social
media naysayers. Both the "like" and the subsequent "unlike" would need to
be noted based on the political and expressive significance of each action. It
is important to note that the government would have little control over its
employees' ability to "unlike" content, because Facebook is privately owned
and controlled.82
In light of these practical concerns, regulators could also choose to uniformly prohibit all public employees from "liking" Facebook content. Voildi,
the public records problem is solved. But regulating "likes" across the board
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment. 83 The justification for a
prohibition on "likes" in the first place would likely be their significance as
expressive statements and their capacity to convey more than mere enjoyment of a particular post. However, the conclusion that Facebook "likes"
have expressive value should not result in their complete prohibition. Due to
the First Amendment implications inherent in regulating a public employee's
Facebook "likes," government regulators would be left with two choices: (1)
distinguish Facebook "likes" that relate to a matter of public concern from
those that are purely private in nature, and allow private "likes" while prohibiting public "likes"; or (2) require public employees to maintain separate
public and personal Facebook pages, and allow them to "like" content from
their personal page only.84
79.

Once the "like" icon has been clicked, that icon will be replaced with the "unlike" icon, allowing users to retract their Facebook "likes". See Desktop Help,
Connecting, Like, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/4524469981203
60/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).

80.

See id.

81.

See Kansas Judge Causes Stirjudge causes stir with Facebook 'like', supra
note 67.

82.

See Sherman, supra note 55, at 103-04 ("Because social networks are, for the
most part, third party applications, their features, format, and rules are not directly controlled by the public officials or government agencies that use them.
Consequently, any restrictions on use of social media by public officials can
only be enforced by monitoring and enforcement, under threat of some penalty,
rather than through design modifications or access limitations.").

83.

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 161 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Unconstrained discussion concerning the manner in which the government
performs its duties is an essential element of the public discourse necessary to
informed self-government.").

84.

Id. at 461 ("A public employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights to
comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment.").
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However, even these solutions present practical problems. First, the
only real means of distinguishing "likes" relating to a public issue from those
that are purely private would be to analyze the substance of the Facebook
content "liked." But the line between public and private is often unclear. For
instance, assume a prosecutor, Travis, works regularly with the same private
investigator, Mike. Travis and Mike spend significant quantities of time together at work and become friends. Subsequently, they also become
Facebook "friends." One day, Mike posts on Facebook, "I am so lucky to get
to work so closely with my good friend, Travis. He is such an outstanding
person, and I feel safer on the streets knowing that he is representing the
good guys. He could not have done a better job in court today, and the world
is now a safer place." Travis then "likes" this post.
The problem in this example is that some of the post is personal in
nature, relating to the relationship between Travis and Mike, while other
parts of the post relate to Travis's work as a prosecutor. Is it appropriate for
Travis to "like" this post if there is a prohibition on "likes" relating to matters
of Travis's public employment? This example is a close call. Arguably,
Travis has not commented on any pending cases, or on the defendant's guilt
in the particular case referenced, so the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility would not hold Travis accountable for "liking" this statement. 85 On the other hand, if there is a prohibition on "likes" relating to all
matters of public employment in order to avoid public records problems, it
would be hard, in this example, to determine if Travis violated that
prohibition.
This problem would not be solved by allowing public officials to maintain personal Facebook pages only. Distinguishing between private and public pages assumes that creating a personal Facebook page can insulate an
official's Facebook activity from being considered as occurring within an
official course of conduct. Even if a public official were acting on a personal
Facebook page, a "like" of Facebook content relating to a matter of public
concern might still be considered acting within the official course of business. It is difficult to separate a person from his work on the basis of the
privacy settings of his Facebook page alone.
For example, the Ohio School Board President, Debe Terhar, drew criticism when she re-published on her personal Facebook page a friend's picture
that "seemed to equate gun control efforts with the views of Adolf Hitler."86
Terhar posted the photo on her private account visible to her Facebook
"friends" only. 87 Unfortunately for her, a "friend" captured an image of the

R. 3.8. (2013).

85.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

86.

Andrew Tobias, Social Media Post Getting Public Officials in Trouble, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Jan. 27, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.daytondailynews.
com/news/news/local-govt-politics/social-media-post-getting-public-officialsin-trou/nT672/.

87.

Id.
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post and leaked it publicly.88 Critics responded by calling for her resignation.89 This example illustrates how a public official's social media audience
is unable to separate the public Facebook user from the private Facebook
user.
These practical problems would inevitably result from attempting to
regulate public officials' Facebook "likes." The practical concerns, however,
are not the only considerations supporting government employees' rights to
"like" Facebook content. Most importantly, regulation of public officials'
"likes" is unnecessary based on how Facebook users perceive a "like."
B.

Socio-Cultural Considerations: Facebook as an Open,
Transparent Political Forum

Facebook users do not operate in a vacuum. By definition, Facebook is
an online community.90 Like any community, Facebook is governed by
socio-cultural normative rules that dictate appropriate conduct in the community.91 Public officials who use Facebook must play by those rules.
The desire to regulate public officials' Facebook conduct is driven by a
misunderstanding of these Facebook norms. Critics of Facebook incorrectly
think there will be a lack of transparency in public officials' actions on
Facebook if their ability to post and "like" is left unchecked. This fear of a
lack of transparency is the same fear that initially produced public records
laws.92

But those paralyzed by fear at the prospect of wild, uncontrolled social
media use by public officials fail to recognize that the social and cultural
norms of Facebook have created more transparent political dialogue than has
ever existed. First, the ability of officials to post on Facebook with ease and
frequency puts new pressure on public officials for a more consistent release
of information. On April 29, 2015, of the ten subjects "trending on

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90.

Edward Mercer, The Importance of Facebook, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, http://
smallbusiness.chron.com/importance-facebook-56887.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2015) ("The sociologist Benedict Anderson defines a community as a group
where even if the members do not know each other personally, they recognize
each other's existence as parts of the whole and share a set of common practices and experiences. With its one billion users-a number comparable to the
population of Europe and the United States combined-Facebook is one such
community.").

91.

Id.

92.

Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 786 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Wis. 2010) ("[T]his
review [of official emails] is important; without it, the people will be deprived
of the transparency the legislature mandated in the public records law.").
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Facebook" five of them were political in nature. 93 This is the result of the fact
that Facebook has become a community used to share political news,
messages, and ideas.
In fact, not only does Facebook allow the release of political information, but it often gives constituents a tool to demand such information. It is
harder for public officials to hide their dirty laundry when constituents have
the ability to demand a response to political issues on social media. For example, in response to the April 28, 2015, Baltimore riots, Baltimore Mayor,
Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, posted:
Thanks again to all our law enforcement and fire officials, emergency management personnel, and National Guard for working
around the clock. To all those who shared my anger and heartbreak, thank you for your work in our communities and for showing the world Baltimore's resilience. And to those actively
demonstrating, I call for peace. Tonight we must be #OneBaltimore. Thank you for holding the line.?94?
A plausible explanation for her very public and sincere take on the riots
is that silence on social media is now considered avoidance of undesirable
political issues or an unwillingness to take a stance. This type of unwillingness to comment is relevant-and troublesome-to constituents, and is of
value to constituents when they weigh candidates. Facebook has therefore
given constituents unprecedented leverage by requiring their officials to keep
them honestly informed.
Additionally, Facebook observers are starting to recognize that
Facebook is indeed governed by social understandings unique to the
Facebook community. These understandings have produced more lax perspectives on whether government officials should be allowed to use social
media. For instance, authorities are beginning to conclude that judges may
maintain Facebook pages and "friend" attorneys. 95 These types of interac-

93.

Subjects trending included "Baltimore unrest," "Texas State Guard," "King of
Saudi Arabia," "Joseph Kent," and "Nepal Earthquake." FACEBOOK, https://
(last visited
www.facebook.com/WhatsTrending/videos/990714007635222/
Nov. 13, 2015) (user login required).

94.

Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/stephanie.
rawlingsblake/photos/a. 168803463208519.46210.165763450179187/80480899
6274626/?type=3&fref=nf (Apr. 28, 2015) (user login required).

95.

See, e.g., Browning, supra note 6, at 532 ("Most states, and ABA Judicial Ethics Opinion 462, acknowledge that the use of social networking sites can benefit judges in both their personal and professional lives, including not just
helping a judge stay in touch with the rest of the community, but also providing
vital tools for raising both funds and voter awareness in states where judges are
elected officials. In addition, most states view the mere existence of a Facebook
'friendship,' without more, as signifying very little due to the realities of
'friendship' in the digital age.").
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tions on Facebook are permissible, because, as one court put it, "it's no secret
that the 'friend' label means less in cyberspace than it does in the neighborhood, or in the workplace, or on the schoolyard, or anywhere else that
humans interact as real people."96 In other words, Facebook "friending"
means something different in the context of the Facebook community.97
Sending a friend request is similar to "liking" a post. Both actions seek to
establish a connection that can be viewed and perceived by others. Accordingly, these connections are no longer considered abnormal or per se
inappropriate.
Of course, the social norms surrounding Facebook use have not yet created a perfect cyber-world in which users are cognizant of what they post and
sensitive to the potential ramifications of their Facebook speech. Indeed, this
article is rife with examples of official misconduct on social media. However, as Facebook use continues to increase-and it likely will-the attitudes
and social norms surrounding Facebook use will continue to develop. Increased demands for self-awareness on Facebook will govern what public
officials post and "like" on Facebook. And as Facebook's use as a political
tool continues to increase, there will be a correlative increase in the constituent's ability to demand honest information.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Facebook allows an unprecedented exchange of political ideas. A transparent political dialogue should not become reprehensible conduct at the
click of the "like" button. Instead, regulation of public officials' conduct
should be left to the social norms that surround Facebook for several reasons.
First, as Professor Browning has explained, the "[l]aw is never going to keep
pace with technology. Adopt a specialized rule now addressing a particular
medium, and both the medium and the rule will be obsolete before you know
it."98 Additionally, Facebook "likes" have political and commercial value. To
regulate them on that basis because they cannot be controlled or archived
encroaches on the First Amendment. While the government has the authority
to regulate what its public employees say, those employees still maintain the
right to post private content. However, because the law cannot practically
distinguish between private and public Facebook content, it should take a
less restrictive approach to public officials' conduct on Facebook. Instead,
regulation of official conduct should be left to the Facebook community itself. The result is likely to be a more sensitive, self-aware collection of public
Facebook users who are wary of the possible criticism of the people who
matter to them most: their constituents.

96.
97.
98.

Williams v. Scribd, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90496, at *16 (S.D. Cal. June
23, 2010).
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